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The Growing Acceptance and Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage 
in America Constitutes a Victory for Reality-Based Thinking 
 
Wilson R. Huhn* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 During the 20th century “pragmatism” emerged as the leading American philosophy and 
policy analysis – also called “legal realism” – became the dominant method of interpreting 
American law.1 The lightning speed with which same-sex marriage is gaining acceptance in the 
United States is due to the fact that Americans embrace realistic rather than ideological forms of 
thinking, and the growing recognition of same-sex marriage in the law is due to the fact that we 
interpret our Constitution in accordance with realistic analysis. 
 
 Part I of this paper briefly describes the great strides that same-sex marriage has made in 
the United States over the past decade. Parts II, III, IV, and V summarize how realist analysis 
transformed American philosophy, jurisprudence, and constitutional law during the 20th century, 
resulting in the emergence of a reality-based “equality principle.” Part VI explains how the 
struggle for marriage equality for gay and lesbian couples has advanced because of these realistic 
methods for making choices in policy and the law. 
 
I. THE RAPID ACCEPTANCE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 Over the past 16 years American attitudes towards same-sex marriage have shifted 
dramatically. According to Gallup, in 1996 68% of Americans were opposed to same-sex 
marriage; only 27% of Americans were in favor of allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry.2 
In contrast, in 2011 for the first time Gallup found that 53% of Americans approved of marriage 
equality for same-sex couples with only 45% opposed.3 
 
 Legal recognition in the states has followed in the wake of social acceptance. In 2003 not 
a single state permitted gays and lesbians to marry their partners.4 In 2012 nine states and the 
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District of Columbia recognize same-sex marriage.5 More than 85 million people live in these 
ten jurisdictions, constituting more than one-fourth of the American population.6  
 
 The trend towards recognition of same-sex marriage seems to be accelerating. The Gallup 
poll mentioned earlier showed a massive swing on the issue in one year, from 44-53 opposed in 
2010 to 53-45 in favor in 2011. This rapid movement towards acceptance of marriage equality is 
also evident from the recent trend of decisions by state courts and legislatures extending 
recognition of same-sex unions. Of the four state supreme court decisions opposing same-sex 
marriage, three were handed down “long ago” in 2006 and one in 2007.7 Of the four state 
supreme court decisions approving same-sex marriage, one was handed down in 2003 
(Massachusetts), two in 2008, and one in 2009.8 The six statutes recognizing same-sex marriage 
were all enacted since 2009.9 Finally, since 2010 three federal district courts and one federal 
appeals court have issued decisions striking down laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.10 Two 
other actions are pending in federal district courts.11 
 
 What accounts for this rapid shift in American life and law? What made this change 
possible? It is in large part due to the fact that Americans embrace a realistic approach to the 
development of public policy and the interpretation of the law. 
 
II. REALITY-BASED AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Americans have always been a practical people. Alexis de Toqueville observed of our 
ancestors, “I think that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy 
than in the United States.”12  Rejecting “speculative studies” as well as “tradition” and “national 
prejudices,” Americans, he said: 
 
“like to discern the object which engages their attention with extreme clearness; 
they therefore strip off as much as possible all that covers it, they rid themselves 
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of whatever separates them from it, they remove whatever conceals it from sight, 
in order to view it more closely and in the broad light of day.”13 
 
De Toqueville attributed our independent strain of thought and realistic frame of reference to the 
influence of democracy. “Equality begets in man the desire of judging of everything for himself: 
it gives him, in all things, a taste for the tangible and the real, a contempt for tradition and for 
forms.”14 
 
 American philosophy continued to be grounded in “realism.” In the 1870s the brilliant 
physical scientist Charles Sanders Peirce argued for a “pragmatic” understanding of scientific 
principles, an idea he eventually called “pragmaticism.”15 In 1907 American philosopher 
William James published his landmark work Pragmatism: A New Name for Old Ways of 
Thinking, dedicated to John Stuart Mill and citing John Dewey.16 In Lecture VI, Pragmatism’s 
Conception of Truth, James distinguishes “pragmatism” from “intellectualism” on the ground 
that pragmatists demand proof of the truth of a concept from experience: 
 
Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. "Grant an idea or belief to 
be true," it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's 
actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different 
from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the 
truth's cash-value in experiential terms?" 
 
The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: TRUE IDEAS 
ARE THOSE THAT WE CAN ASSIMILATE, VALIDATE, CORROBORATE 
AND VERIFY. FALSE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CANNOT. That is the 
practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the 
meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as.17 
 
The popular philosopher, educator, and social reformer John Dewey described how pragmatic 
philosophy operates in the life of the individual. Dewey explained that truth emerges from the 
interaction of an organism with its environment; truth is determined experientially and is proven 
by its usefulness to the organism.18 As one authority states: “Thus Dewey adopted the term 
“instrumentalism” as a descriptive appellation for his new approach.”19 
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 At the same time that the theories of pragmatism and instrumentalism became ascendant 
in American philosophy, a similar approach took hold in jurisprudential circles. It is to that 
theory – “legal realism” – that I now turn. 
 
III.  REALITY-BASED AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 The school of “legal realism” is most often associated with American academicians, but it 
was brought into our law and became the central feature of American jurisprudence through the 
action of four great judges: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 
and Learned Billings Hand. Today, policy analysis lies at the heart of constitutional law. It is the 
defining characteristic of the fundamental constitutional standards we call “strict scrutiny” and 
the “rational basis test.” 
 
The Realist Academicians 
 
 Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School, is generally credited with founding the 
school of “legal realism.” In a 1912 article Pound used the term “sociological jurisprudence” to 
describe this new method of analysis.20  Pound insisted that in interpreting the law judges should 
“take more account, and more intelligent account, of the social facts upon which law must 
proceed and to which it is to be applied.”21  
 
 Another legal realist, Professor John Dickinson of the University of Pennsylvania, 
maintained that judicial precedent should be understood principally in terms of the results that 
would flow from following a particular line of precedent and the values that would be served. As 
he explained in his 1929 article The Law Behind Law:  
 
 The choice which a judge makes of one analogy rather than another is an 
expression of ... a value-judgment; and the possibility of competing analogies 
therefore arises not merely or so much out of the doubtfulness of the factual 
resemblances among his materials, but rather out of the possibility of differences 
of opinion as to the comparative value of the different results which one analogy 
or the other would bring about.22 
 
 Karl Llewellyn, a leading realist who became a principal drafter of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, described sociological jurisprudence in the following terms: 
 
[T]he central problem of all law has to do with this still almost completely 
neglected descriptive science, with this “legal sociology,” this natural science of 
living law.  What we need to study, what we must know, is not how a legal rule 
reads, nor how a philosophically correct rule would read, but what the legal rule 
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means.  Not in ... the heaven of legal concepts, but in human experience.  What 
happens in life with it?  What does a law mean to ordinary people?23 
 
 Today “legal realism” so influences academic legal thought that it has spawned multiple 
independent schools of realistic analysis. On the right, the school of “law and economics” uses 
the science of economics in interpreting the law in order to foster economic efficiency and 
wealth maximization.24 On the left, various schools of “critical” legal analysis – critical legal 
studies, critical race theory, critical feminist theory, and many others – insist that law must be 
understood in the context of its effect on oppressed populations.25 All of these schools of 
jurisprudence share the assumption that the law should be interpreted in the light of human 
experience.  
 
The Realist Judges 
 
 The names of the judges who embraced legal realism and brought it into American law 
are familiar every lawyer: Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Hand. Each of them emphasized that 
judges must take into account the consequences of their interpretations of the law – how the law 
would affect people in their daily lives. Their contributions to our realist understanding of the 
law are briefly described below. 
 
 a. Oliver Wendell Holmes – The Skeptic 
 
 Oliver Wendell Holmes is justly regarded as one of the greatest American judges. In the 
field of Constitutional Law we are indebted to him for writing courageous dissents laying the 
groundwork for two fundamentally important doctrines: the right of the individual to freedom of 
speech and the power of the legislature to enact economic legislation. In addition, Holmes paved 
the way for the adoption of realistic modes of legal analysis. All three of these accomplishments 
were due to the fact that Holmes was a profound skeptic. 
 
 In the area of First Amendment law, Holmes is justly celebrated for conceiving the 
“marketplace of ideas,” the notion that political and social truth is most likely to be discovered if 
there is “free trade in ideas.”26 The origin of this doctrine lay in Holmes’ personal philosophy, a 
                                                 
23
  Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 705, 748-749 (1992).  Llewellyn’s contribution to 
the legal realism movement is described in WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 
(1973); and William Twining, Talk about Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 342 (1985).  Llewellyn’s influence on 
the Uniform Commercial Code is the subject of Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl 
Llewellyn's Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141 (1985); and 
Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff:  The Progressive Development 
of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351 (1983). 
24
 See Brian Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 204 (2009) (stating, “Part of the power of economic 
analysis is that it presents a largely instrumental approach”). 
25
 See id. at 231 (stating, “Over the last 30 years or so, a series of loosely-related critical approaches to law have 
developed, which have their roots in (among other places) the Civil Rights Movement, American legal realism, and 
European social theory.”). 
26
 Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (stating, “when men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”). 
philosophy he explained to Judge Learned Hand as they debated the constitutionality of federal 
laws that were being used to crush dissent to the First World War. On June 24, 1918, Holmes 
wrote to Hand, “I don’t bother about absolute truth or even inquire whether there is such a thing 
….”
27
 Holmes’ skepticism eventually led him to believe that it was unconstitutional for the 
government to suppress the expression of unpopular opinions.28 
 
 The same deep streak of skepticism led Holmes to take the position that the courts must 
accord a presumption of constitutionality to economic legislation. Dissenting in Lochner v. New 
York29 Holmes wrote: 
 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country 
does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should 
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not 
conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or 
disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their 
opinions in law.30  
 
He added: 
 
[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether 
of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. 
It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our 
finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought 
not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them 
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.31 
 
 Holmes coined a number of famous aphorisms that reflect his commitment to realism in 
legal analysis. In Lochner he stated: “General propositions do not decide concrete cases.”32 In 
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner33 he said: “a page of history is worth more than a volume of 
logic.”34 And in The Common Law he wrote: “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience.”35 The point of each of these sayings is that judges must take human experience into 
account in interpreting the law. 
 
 Holmes challenged traditional methods of legal analysis from the bench. Brandeis 
challenged the traditional paradigm from the bar. 
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  Louis Brandeis – The Reformer 
 
 Before his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1916, Louis Brandeis was the “People’s 
Lawyer,” fighting on behalf of the average person against corrupt and abusive corporate 
practices. He achieved one of his greatest victories in 1908 the case of Muller v. Oregon,36 where 
he persuaded the Supreme Court to uphold a state law which provided that women could work in 
factories no more than ten hours per day. In support of his clients he submitted a 113-page 
brief.37 The brief contained only two pages devoted to legal analysis; the remainder summarized 
dozens of sociological and economic studies of the effect of long hours of work on women and 
their families.38 Thus was born the “Brandeis brief.” 
 
 Explaining his approach to legal advocacy Brandeis said: “The method I have tried to 
employ in arguing cases has been inductive, reasoning from the facts.”39 In Muller Brandeis 
showed the Court why human experience demanded that the law be upheld. 
 
 Benjamin Nathan Cardozo – The Policy Analyst of the Common Law 
 
 Justice Cardozo was the greatest common law judge that the United States has produced. 
His opinions fill American casebooks on the law of contracts and torts.40 The method that he 
mastered in developing the common law was to examine a line of cases looking not for factual 
similarities but rather for the thread of policy that ran through the law.  
 
One of the foundational cases in the law of tort is Cardozo’s decision in McPherson v.  
Buick Motor Co.41 in which the New York State Court of Appeals determined that an automobile 
driver could recover for damages suffered when a defective wheel fell apart.  This case appears 
in nearly every casebook on torts because it illustrates how to choose between two different lines 
of authority, a common problem in the common law.  The New York courts had on many 
occasions ruled that the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright (finding no liability for injuries 
cause by a defective wagon wheel) was good law,42 but they had also ruled that if an item was 
“inherently dangerous” like scaffolding then the manufacturer could be held liable if it was 
negligently made.43 One might take the position that an automobile is more like a wagon than it 
is like a scaffold, but writing for the majority Cardozo found that the operative principle should 
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be whether or not the product, if negligently made, would be “inherently dangerous” to the 
public.44 He wrote: 
 
Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions 
of travel today.  The principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, 
but the things subject to the principle do change.  They are whatever the needs of 
life in a developing civilization require them to be.45 
 
 Similarly, in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,46 Cardozo rejected the notion of “exact 
performance” under the law of contract and instead adopted the rule of “substantial 
performance.” In the case of a minor or technical breach of contract, Cardozo ruled that the 
measure of damages is not the cost of rectifying the error but rather the difference in value 
between the promised performance and the actual performance. 47 In rejecting the clear rule 
requiring exact performance of a contract for the more ambiguous standard permitting substantial 
performance plus a measure of damages for any reduction in value, Cardozo said: 
 
Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development of legal rules 
than of practical adaptation to the attainment of a just result will be troubled by a 
classification where the lines of division are so wavering and blurred. Something, 
doubtless, may be said on the score of consistency and certainty in favor of a 
stricter standard. The courts have balanced such considerations against those of 
equity and fairness, and found the latter to be the weightier.48 
 
In his masterpiece Nature of the Judicial Process Cardozo explained the central role that policy 
analysis must play in legal reasoning: 
 
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim 
cannot permanently justify its existence . . . . Logic and history and custom have 
their place. We will shape the law to conform to them when we may; but only 
within bounds. The end which the law serves will dominate them all.49 
 
 Learned Billings Hand: The Mathematical Consequentialist:  
 
 Judge Hand – perhaps the greatest American judge never to serve on the United States 
Supreme Court – advanced realist analysis by demonstrating how the pertinent values served by 
the law might be rationally balanced. His most famous contribution to American law was in the 
1947 case United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,50 where he reduced the law of tort to a clear, 
concise, and elegant formula. The question in that case was whether the owner of a barge was 
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liable to others when the barge slipped her moorings and drifted downriver, damaging another 
vessel. Hand said: 
 
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and 
since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner’s duty, as 
in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of 
three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the 
resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it 
serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: If the 
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon 
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.51 
 
 According to Hand, liability under the law of tort is not predicated upon some a priori 
concept of “duty” or “morality” but rather by reference to the likelihood and foreseeability that a 
person’s actions will harm others. 
 
 The following portion of this article describes how the realist movement transformed 
American Constitutional Law during the second half of the 20th century.  
 
IV.  REALISM IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
 In the second half of the 20th century the realist movement transformed both the process 
and the substance of American Constitutional Law. It not only led to the overruling of long-
established constitutional precedent, it revolutionized how the constitutionality of laws is 
determined.  
 
Brown v. Board of Education 
 
The most important decision of the 20th century is without question Brown v. Board of 
Education.52 In that case the Supreme Court overruled the longstanding principle of “separate but 
equal” and overturned the deeply rooted social custom of racial segregation.53 In writing the 
opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren could not rely upon the 
standard interpretive techniques of tradition, precedent, or the intent of the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Precedent and tradition both supported the separation of the races.54 
Original intent, said the Court, was both indeterminate and no longer relevant in light of how 
much the field of public education had changed since 1868.55 Providing separate educational 
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facilities for the children of different races is unconstitutional, said the Court, because “it may 
affect their hearts and minds in ways unlikely ever to be undone.”56 In short it was the 
consequences flowing from the practice of racial segregation that made the doctrine of “separate 
but equal” unconstitutional – not its pedigree in the law. 
 
The Rational Basis and Strict Scrutiny Tests 
 
The realist revolution utterly revised constitutional analysis. At the time of Brown the 
Supreme Court was moving towards a consequentialist form of reasoning for all cases involving 
constitutional rights. As a result of this change laws that do not infringe individual rights are 
evaluated under the “rational basis” test, while laws that do affect fundamental rights are subject 
to the “strict scrutiny” test.  
 
In 1938 in the case of United States v. Carolene Products57 the Supreme Court 
announced a highly deferential test for determining the constitutionality of ordinary legislative 
enactments.58 This standard – the “rational basis test” – does not evaluate the constitutionality of 
laws by reference to tradition or original intent. Instead, under this standard the courts determine 
constitutionality in light of the goal that the legislation is intended to achieve. So long as the law 
is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest” the law must be upheld.59 In footnote 4 of 
Carolene Products, however, the Court warned that laws infringing fundamental rights or 
affecting the rights of minority groups could be subjected to “more exacting judicial scrutiny.”60 
 
By 1965 the Supreme Court had fully developed the “more exacting judicial scrutiny” 
that it had referred to Carolene Products – a standard that it called “strict scrutiny.” In Griswold 
v. Connecticut61 the Court held that when strict scrutiny applies, the government must 
demonstrate not only that the law has some tendency to achieve a legitimate governmental 
purpose, but that the law is necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental purpose.62  
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 Both rational basis and strict scrutiny are consequentialist forms of analysis. Under both 
tests the constitutionality of a law is determined not by its conformity to custom or existing 
doctrine, but rather by reference to the “ends” that the law seeks to achieve and the “means” used 
to accomplish those ends. With rational basis, the consequence that the law seeks to accomplish 
need only be “legitimate” and the law itself need only have “some tendency” to achieve that 
purpose. When strict scrutiny applies the law must serve a “compelling” governmental purpose 
and the law must be both “likely” to achieve that goal and be the “least restrictive means,” 
meaning that the government’s goal must be sufficiently important and the likelihood of 
achieving that goal must be sufficiently probable so as to justify both the infringement on 
constitutional rights and the unintended consequences flowing from the enforcement of the law. 
Strict scrutiny is a consequentialist form of analysis that closely resembles Hand’s formula 
B<PL.63  
 
The Constitution’s adherence to realist analysis is nowhere more evident than in how it 
has come to interpret the principle of equality that is inherent in the concept of Equal Protection.  
The realistic standard that the Supreme Court has developed may be referred to as the “equality 
principle.” 
 
V. THE REALITY-BASED EQUALITY PRINCIPLE 
 
 In modern decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause the Supreme Court has 
adhered to a simple yet powerful idea – a basic moral concept that may be called the “equality 
principle.” This fundamental principle is that people who are “similarly situated” must be treated 
the same. As a legal standard the equality principle confers great power and grave responsibility 
upon the courts. It requires the courts to determine whether two groups of people are or are not 
similar in a particular context; if they are similar, the law must treat them the same. 
 
 The Supreme Court has consistently applied this principle only in the past half-century, 
but its origin may be traced to the latter part of the 19th century. In 1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins64 
the San Francisco Board of Supervisors had denied permits to all Chinese residents to operate 
laundries. In determining the constitutionality of the city’s action, the Court articulated the 
equality principle in the negative; the Court stated that a law is constitutional only if it treats in 
like fashion all persons who are similarly situated: 
 
“Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; 
but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application 
if, within the sphere of its operation, it affects alike all persons similarly situated, 
is not within the amendment.”65 
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Applying this principle in Yick Wo the Supreme Court reversed the discriminatory actions of the 
San Francisco Board of Supervisors, finding their conduct to be in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 
 
The Supreme Court began to routinely invoke the equality principle during the latter 
portion of the 20th century. In 1971 in Reed v. Reed67 the Court approximated the language and 
followed the example of Yick Wo. In Reed the Court struck down an Idaho law that preferred 
men over women in the administration of estates.68 Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice 
Burger said: 
 
By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly 
situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.69 
 
In 1984 in the case of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centers70 the Court had to decide 
whether persons with mental disabilities were entitled to establish a group home in a 
neighborhood that was zoned for group living establishments like fraternities and old-age 
homes.71 Despite finding that intelligence is not a suspect classification,72 Justice Bryon White 
ruled that persons with disabilities did have that right because they aren’t different, in any 
relevant way, from those other groups, in the context of being permitted to live together in a 
group home.73 In articulating the general principle that governed the case he said: 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no 
State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws,” which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike.74 
 
In 2003, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,75 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor echoed 
White’s words in coming to the conclusion that gays and lesbians could not be imprisoned for 
engaging in homosexual sex: 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘is essentially a 
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’76 
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 From the foregoing cases it appears that the equality principle applies across the board 
not matter what distinctions the law draws among different groups of people. Race has been 
found to be a suspect classification,77 gender is quasi-suspect,78 intelligence is non-suspect,79 and 
the suspectness of sexual orientation has yet to be determined by the Supreme Court.80 But the 
Court applied the equality principle to all of these groups, and in none of these cases did the 
Court find that their characteristics warranted treating people differently. In each case the Court 
found that the different groups of people were “similarly situated.” 
 
 Are gay and lesbian couples similar to heterosexual couples with respect to marriage? 
Under the equality principle that question must be answered in order to determine whether or not 
the Equal Protection Clause protects their right to marry. In accordance with American 
philosophy and jurisprudence the answer to that question must be based upon proven facts and 
actual experience, not by reference to traditional moral and religious beliefs. The following 
portion of this article describes how advances in social science have demonstrated that gays and 
lesbians should be granted an equal right to marry. 
 
VI. REALITY-BASED ANALYSIS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
 
 What changed after 2007 that generated numerous victories for gay and lesbian couples 
in American courts and legislatures? Very simply, American judges and legislators came to 
believe that there are no significant differences between same-sex and different-sex couples in 
the context of marriage. This was also the overwhelming consensus of social science researchers. 
 
The Prop 8 Trial 
 
The equality of same-sex couples was unequivocally demonstrated during the “Prop 8 
Trial” conducted by federal District Judge Vaughn Walker.81 The legal issue in that case was 
whether Proposition 8, an amendment to the California Constitution taking away the right of 
same-sex couples to marry, was constitutional under Equal Protection. Judge Walker invited the 
parties to offer evidence and expert testimony on the questions whether sexual orientation is a 
“suspect classification,” whether gay lesbian couples were capable of performing the 
responsibilities of marriage, and whether their families would benefit from marriage.  
 
The plaintiffs in the Prop 8 Trial called nine expert witnesses, each of them possessing a 
prestigious degree and holding a position at a leading university.82 The direct and cross 
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examination of these witnesses extended to thousands of pages of the trial transcript.83 They 
testified that gays and lesbians have been historically discriminated against; that compared to 
heterosexuals they lack effective political power; that sexual orientation is rarely chosen or 
subject to change; that same-sex couples love each other just as much and are as devoted to each 
other as different-sex couples; that gay and lesbian couples are as good at parenting as different-
sex couples; that marriage will benefit the couples, their children, and their families; and that the 
admission of same-sex couples to the institution of marriage will not in the least harm existing 
marriages or marriage as an institution.84 
 
The defendants in the Prop 8 case called but two witnesses, David Blankenhorn and 
Kenneth Miller.85 Blankenhorn earned a Masters in comparative social history from the 
University of Warwick, England.86 Although he had authored several books and articles on 
same-sex marriage, he had conducted no peer-reviewed research.87 Instead, he developed his 
expertise by “read[ing] articles and hav[ing] conversations with people, and try[ing] to be an 
informed person about it.”88 The trial court ruled Mr. Blankenhorn’s testimony inadmissible 
because he was not qualified to testify as an expert.89 Dr. Miller, a, professor of government at 
Claremont McKenna College, was declared qualified as an expert in political science generally 
but not on the political power of gays and lesbians specifically.90 The trial court ruled his 
testimony admissible but entitled to only limited weight.91 The defendants declined to call any 
other witnesses.92 
 
The trial court rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs striking down Proposition 8. In 
support of its ruling the court entered dozens of findings, each supported by multiple references 
to the trial record. Here are a few of the court’s findings: 
 
48. Same-sex couples are identical to opposite-sex couples in the 
characteristics relevant to the ability to form successful marital unions. Like 
opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples have happy, satisfying relationships and 
form deep emotional bonds and strong commitments to their partners. 
Standardized measures of relationship satisfaction, relationship adjustment and 
love do not differ depending on whether a couple is same-sex or opposite-sex.93 
 
50. Same-sex couples receive the same tangible and intangible benefits 
from marriage that opposite-sex couples receive.94 
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55. Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of 
opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of 
marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex marriages.95 
 
56. The children of same-sex couples benefit when their parents can 
marry.96 
 
70. The gender of a child's parent is not a factor in a child's adjustment. 
The sexual orientation of an individual does not determine whether that individual 
can be a good parent. Children raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as 
children raised by heterosexual parents to be healthy, successful and well-
adjusted. The research supporting this conclusion is accepted beyond serious 
debate in the field of developmental psychology.97 
  
 The foregoing findings were pertinent only because the constitutionality of Proposition 8 
was dependent upon the consequences that would flow from the judge’s interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause: the effects of the law on same-sex couples, their children, and all other 
married persons. If in fact same-sex couples are “similarly situated” to different-sex couples with 
respect to marriage, then Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause. It was the reality-
based “equality principle” that made the expert testimony relevant and material to the 
constitutional question before the court. 
 
The expert witnesses did not testify as to the ultimate legal conclusion to be derived from 
their testimony – that is, they did not testify that Proposition 8 is constitutional or 
unconstitutional. In that sense they did not testify about what the law is. Instead, they simply laid 
the factual predicate upon which the court based its decision finding Proposition 8 to be 
unconstitutional.  
 
The Prop 8 Trial wasn’t necessary. If he had chosen, Judge Walker could simply have 
taken judicial notice of the “legislative facts” that were at issue.98 As one eminent authority has 
stated, “In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law, the judge is 
unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion.”99 Judge Walker could instead have simply 
consulted historical, sociological, and political science sources identified by the parties or of his 
own choosing. For example, in Brown v. Board of Education the Court simply cited seven 
authorities from the field of psychology in support of its finding that racial segregation harms 
children’s hearts and minds.100 
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 But Judge Walker did conduct the Prop 8 Trial to determine whether or not sexual 
orientation is a suspect classification and what the effect of marriage equality would be on same-
sex couples and different-sex couples. What is remarkable about Judge Walker’s decision is that 
these matters are pure questions of law. In essence Judge Walker treated the issues under 
consideration as if they were questions of fact subject to the rules of evidence and capable of 
being proven true or false. Experts on these questions were subject to cross-examination, “the 
greatest engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”101 The Prop 8 trial represents 
remarkable proof of the incorporation of pragmatism and the scientific method into American 
legal thought – the triumph of legal realism. 
 
Subsequent Social Science Research 
 
Since the Prop 8 case was decided two more comprehensive studies comparing gay and 
lesbian couples to different-sex couples have been published. In 2010 Michael J. Rosenfeld of 
Stanford University published a summary of 45 studies and found no significant difference 
between the children of same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples in their school progress.102 In 
2011 the Williams Institute published the results of a massive study of marriage and divorce 
rates drawing on information from the U.S. Census Bureau and state administrative agencies.103 
The authors found substantial equality between same-sex couples and different-sex couples on 
marriage rates and likelihood of divorce.104 
 
The most impressive compilation of data is a Brandeis brief submitted by five national 
professional organizations: the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric 
Association, National Association of Social Workers, American Medical Association, and  
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American Academy of Pediatrics.105 Drawing on 86 medical, psychological, and sociological 
studies, the brief concludes: 
 
Homosexuality is a normal expression of human sexuality, is generally not 
chosen, and is highly resistant to change. 
… 
 There is no scientific basis for concluding that gay and lesbian parents are 
any less fit or capable than heterosexual parents, or that their children are any less 
psychologically healthy and well adjusted.106 
 
 In light of these findings, courts and legislatures will find it increasingly difficult to deny 
the fact that same-sex and different-sex couples are equally entitled to enter into marriage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The rapid acceptance of same-sex marriage by American courts and legislators is a 
testament to our society’s commitment to realistic analysis and our faith in human progress. 
 
With that in mind I close this article with quotations from two great Americans: Abraham 
Lincoln and William Brennan. In the first speech of his contest with Stephen Douglas for the 
United States Senate in 1858, Lincoln chose to make the words “all men are created equal” the 
centerpiece of his campaign. In defining the principle of equality Lincoln did not invoke tradition 
or precedent. Instead he treated equality as transcendent principle – a sacred obligation that we 
must constantly strive towards: 
 
My friend [Douglas – ed.] has said to me that I am a poor hand to quote Scripture. 
I will try it again, however. It is said in one of the admonitions of the Lord, “As 
your Father in Heaven is perfect, be ye also perfect.” The Savior, I suppose, did 
not expect that any human creature could be perfect as the Father in Heaven; but 
He said, “As your Father in Heaven is perfect, be ye also perfect.” He set that up 
as a standard, and he who did most towards reaching that standard, attained the 
highest degree of moral perfection. So I say in relation to the principle that all 
men are created equal, let it be as nearly reached as we can.107 
  
Lincoln closed his speech with these words: 
 
I leave you, hoping that the lamp of liberty will burn in your bosoms until there 
shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created free and equal.108 
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The last word I give to William Brennan, who was the first Supreme Court justice to 
author an opinion expressing support for the constitutional equality of gay and lesbian persons.109 
In An Affair with Freedom Brennan describes how scientific thought is slowly replacing 
superstition, and realism is gradually supplanting the myths and prejudices that have blinded us 
to the truth of human equality: 
 
The mists which have obscured the light of freedom and equality for countless 
tens of millions are dissipating. For the unity of the human family is becoming 
more and more distinct on the horizon of human events. The gradual civilization 
of all people replacing the civilization of only the elite, the rise of mass education 
and mass media of communication, the formulation of new thought structures due 
to scientific advances and social evolution--all these phenomena hasten that 
day.110 
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